| Framework Home | Cross-Pillar Governance | AISM | NEXUS | Research | Challenge Lab |
Method version: 1.0
Documentation updated: 2026-10-13
Status: CSI assessment method for use and feedback
Start with the AISM assessment guide for a practical workflow. Use the technology evidence request to collect versioned artifacts from a provider or internal owner before rating claims.
An organization earns an AISM maturity level. A product, paper, benchmark, investigation, or technique contributes evidence toward specific controls. The organizational model’s full name is AI Sovereign Maturity (AISM) Model. This v1.0 review instrument, AISM-TCP, separates that contribution from organization-wide scoring. CSI introduces it as a method for use and feedback. It does not confer certification or add a CLI feature or framework control.
The primary reader is the security leader deciding which control gap to address. The new decision is whether a candidate supplies the needed mechanism and evidence, not whether its vendor has the highest aggregate score. This extends existing runtime-control and research guidance with a scoped adoption method.
| Instrument | Subject | Result | Does not establish |
|---|---|---|---|
| AISM Sovereignty Score | Organization across five pillars and six dimensions | Maturity using coverage, robustness, and sovereignty assurance | Product certification or framework conformance |
| AISM Technology Contribution Profile, v1.0 | Exact artifact and deployment/test boundary | Control effects, pillar contribution, coverage, limitations | Vendor or adopting organization maturity |
| AI SAFE² Evidence Assurance Level, v1.0 | Each attributed claim and supporting artifacts | E0 through E5 under the named assurance rubric | Control completeness, independence by default, or universal prevention |
Report all three independently. Do not multiply contribution by assurance, average pillars to rank purchases, or substitute the maximum pillar contribution for an organizational level. Existing assessment formulas, 161 core controls, profile counts, and component versions remain unchanged.
Each pillar entry contains a score and status, specific mapped claims, coverage, evidence references, and reasoning. Scores describe the highest demonstrated capability within that stated boundary; they do not imply pillar-wide coverage.
| Score | Contribution | Required demonstration |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | None | Reviewed artifact has no material relationship to this pillar |
| 1 | Conceptual | Identifies a risk, principle, or proposed approach |
| 2 | Visibility | Produces inventory, telemetry, analysis, or threat evidence |
| 3 | Governance | Supplies repeatable policy, procedure, assessment, or validation |
| 4 | Control | Enforces or verifies a runtime control with measured outcomes |
| 5 | Sovereignty | Demonstrates continuous adaptation, formal verification of critical behavior within scope, and durable evidence while retaining organizational authority |
The names parallel the maturity ladder, but contribution
1 means Conceptual, not organizational Level 1 Chaos. Use contribution 4, not
AISM Level 4, for technology results.
Use not_assessed with no numeric score when evidence is missing. Use
not_applicable with a reviewed reason when the pillar is outside the review’s
purpose. Neither state is 0. Scores 4 and 5 require reviewable measured results
under assurance v1.0, at least E3 for the claimed behavior;
E4 and E5 cannot be inferred from the contribution score. A paper’s proposed
runtime architecture alone supports a design claim, not demonstrated contribution 4.
For contribution 5, provide repeated challenge/update history, the formal property
and its proof boundary, protected evidence retention, named change/stopping
authority, and inspect/configure/revoke/replace/export capability. Continuous
benchmarking alone or an adaptive model alone is insufficient. A verifier may
support contribution 4 without preventing an action itself; its effect remains
validates, and an enforcement partner must be identified.
| Effect | Meaning | Required distinction |
|---|---|---|
| Addresses | Relevant to the control | Relevance is not implementation |
| Implements | Contains a functioning mechanism | Source availability alone does not prove operation |
| Enforces | Prevents or terminates the prohibited effect within scope | Identify interception point, decision mechanism, actuator, and bypass paths |
| Validates | Tests another control’s operation | A test is not the enforcement mechanism |
| Evidences | Produces records of operation or failure | Logging does not establish prevention |
| Challenges | Shows an assumption or control is insufficient | A finding is not a containment product |
Multiple effects are allowed when each is supported separately. Coverage is
full, partial, none, unknown, or not_applicable for the named control and
boundary, with an explicit denominator where quantified. One enforced path does
not cover other tools, kernels, cloud APIs, descendants, delegated agents, or planes.
Keep required-control applicability distinct from artifact relevance.
Record deterministic interception, probabilistic authorization judgment, and deterministic actuation separately. A model-based ALLOW/DENY decision does not become deterministic merely because its result is enforced outside the agent. Identify failure on timeout, malformed output, policy unavailability, revocation, restart, and enforcement outage. Do not infer fail-closed behavior from normal tests.
Apply the validation guidance before claiming measured runtime control. Use clean/attacked pairs, independent observation of side effects, direct and composed bypasses, outage cases, and legitimate-task utility measures. Keep Challenge Lab C0-C5 distinct from assurance E0-E5 and contribution 0-5. There is no automatic conversion among them.
Incident sources may challenge a control or drive governance improvements. Preserve activity reconstruction, affected-party identification, retention/hold decisions, notification ownership, and regression tests through the incident evidence workflow. A notification or investigative subpoena does not prove a breach, misconduct, or control effectiveness.
Evaluate candidates in this order, preserving unknowns as decision conditions:
A narrow point solution may be the right choice. An unknown prerequisite or critical uncovered path can block adoption regardless of its maximum contribution. Record the resulting decision as adopt, pilot, hold, or reject, with conditions, decision owner, review date, and withdrawal/rollback plan.
Permitted after supporting tests: “This version supplies contribution 4 evidence for the named Shield and Circuit Breaker controls within the tested Linux boundary.” Include the assurance rubric, assessor, test artifacts, date, coverage, and limits.
Prohibited: “ContractWarden is AISM Level 4,” “DGF-Bench proves Level 5 governance,” “open source means independently validated,” or “a passing vendor test establishes our organization’s maturity.”
The nine-example review and adoption backlog uses the supplied recommendations to frame acceptance work. Those examples are source-attributed candidates, not scored certifications or completed integrations.
The CLI already uses E0 through E5 as numeric weights in
aism-model-v1.json. Its evidence summary also
applies verification caps and category completeness. Assurance v1.0 is a separate
claim-level rubric; it does not redefine those weights or the existing grade
field. Do not put a Technology Card or its contribution into an assessment cell.
Existing safe2 aism ingest imports attributed evidence with cells unscored for
review. Assessors still supply organization-specific coverage, robustness, and
sovereignty assurance under the current methodology. A future TCP schema, command,
adapter, dashboard view, or grade translation requires a separate versioned contract,
explicit migration policy, and tests. This update delivers the review method and
documentation, not those runtime features.
| Technology Card | Evidence Assurance | Validation | Examples |
AI SAFE² v3.1 · Cyber Strategy Institute