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Current framework context: AI SAFE² v3.1. This example may preserve historical component versions or earlier framework references where they describe when the implementation was created. For current conformance, use the v3.1 framework and applicable profile requirements.
LangGraph has no BaseCallbackHandler. Enforcement hooks into node functions directly.
Three surfaces are unique to LangGraph and absent from LangChain:
The state dict flows node-to-node. A web-scraper node writes untrusted content
into state["scraped_page"]. That value re-enters the next node’s input.
Without enforcement at node output, it’s an unchecked IPI surface.
StateGuard.scan_state_update() scans only the node’s return dict (the partial
state update — the diff). Not the full state. Never double-scans. ~80% cheaper
than full-state scanning on large graphs.
state["next"] controls which node executes next. An injection payload that
rewrites this key redirects the entire graph to an unauthorized node.
RoutingGuard.validate() checks every routing key value against:
LangGraph subgraphs are how you spawn child agents. Without a depth ceiling, an orchestrator can recurse indefinitely.
sovereign.enter_subgraph() / sovereign.exit_subgraph() enforces:
| ACT Tier | Max Delegation Depth |
|---|---|
| ACT-2 | 5 hops |
| ACT-3 | 2 hops |
| ACT-4 | 3 hops |
from enforcement import SovereignStateGraph, ACTTier
from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, END
sovereign = SovereignStateGraph(
act_tier=ACTTier.ACT3,
declared_nodes=["researcher", "writer", "reviewer"],
routing_key="next",
)
graph = StateGraph(MyState)
graph.add_node("researcher", sovereign.wrap_node("researcher", researcher_fn))
graph.add_node("writer", sovereign.wrap_node("writer", writer_fn))
graph.add_node("reviewer", sovereign.wrap_node("reviewer", reviewer_fn))
graph.set_finish_point("reviewer")
compiled = graph.compile()
result = compiled.invoke({"input": "Write a report on Q3."})
| Control | Name | Enforcement Point |
|---|---|---|
| P1.T1.2 | Malicious Prompt Filtering | Node return value scan |
| P1.T1.5 | Sensitive Data Masking | Node return credential scan |
| P1.T1.10 | Indirect Injection Surface Coverage | StateGuard.scan_state_update() |
| P1.T2.3 | API Gateway Restrictions | URL values in state updates |
| S1.3 | Semantic Isolation Boundary | RoutingGuard.validate() |
| S1.5 | Memory Governance Boundary | protect_state_write() |
| F3.2 | Agent Recursion Limit Governor | Node execution ceiling |
| F3.5 | Multi-Agent Cascade Containment | Node error isolation |
| A2.5 | Semantic Execution Trace Logging | Per-node OCSF event + diff hash |
| M4.5 | Tool-Misuse Detection Controls | Per-node call count ceiling |
| P2.T3.6 | Compliance Validation | compliance_report() |
| CP.3 | ACT Capability Tiers 1-4 | Constructor act_tier |
| CP.4 | Agentic Control Plane Governance | register_nhi() |
| CP.9 | Subgraph Replication Governance | enter_subgraph() / exit_subgraph() |
| CP.10 | HEAR Doctrine | HEAR gate on node output values |
# Orchestrator invoking a child agent as a subgraph
sovereign = SovereignStateGraph(act_tier=ACTTier.ACT3) # max depth: 2
sovereign.enter_subgraph("research-subgraph")
try:
result = research_graph.invoke(state)
finally:
sovereign.exit_subgraph()
# Attempting a 3rd hop raises CircuitTripped[CP.9]
from enforcement.ai_safe2_engine import AISAFE2Engine, ACTTier
shared_engine = AISAFE2Engine(act_tier=ACTTier.ACT3)
# Pass to LangChain handler AND LangGraph sovereign
from enforcement import SovereignStateGraph
sovereign_lg = SovereignStateGraph(engine=shared_engine)
# → One compliance score, one SHA-256 audit chain, one HEAR gate
| *AI SAFE² v3.1 | Cyber Strategy Institute | cyberstrategyinstitute.com* |
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AI SAFE² v3.1 | Cyber Strategy Institute