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Current framework context: AI SAFE² v3.1. This example may preserve historical component versions or earlier framework references where they describe when the implementation was created. For current conformance, use the v3.1 framework and applicable profile requirements.
Cursor shipped 11+ CVEs in 2025-2026. The highest-CVSS is 9.9. One is currently unpatched.
CurXecute writes a malicious MCP server to your config and executes it immediately. MCPoison approves a benign server, then swaps the command. NomShub writes to your shell RC file for persistent access. CVE-2026-26268 escapes the sandbox on the next git operation.
Each of these has a specific architectural pattern. Each has a specific gate. This package provides all eight.
| Surface | CVE / Name | CVSS | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| CU-RULES | Pillar Security (invisible Unicode in .mdc) | — | scan_rules_file() |
| CU-MCP | CurXecute / CVE-2025-54135 | 8.6 | scan_mcp_json() |
| CU-TRUST | MCPoison / CVE-2025-54136 + TrustFall (unpatched) | 7.2 | scan_mcp_server_registration() |
| CU-REPO | CVE-2026-26268 + NomShub | 9.9 | scan_repo_file() |
| CU-CMD | CVE-2026-22708 (builtins bypass Auto-Run) | — | scan_shell_command() |
| CU-IGNORE | CVE-2025-64110 (.cursorignore bypass) | 8.7 | scan_cursorignore() |
| CU-CLOUD | Background agent cloud VM layer | — | scan_cloud_agent_task() |
| CU-SUPPLY | CVE-2025-64106 (MCP installer spoofing) | 8.8 | scan_mcp_install() |
Pattern 1 — Pre-trust execution / TOFU bypass MCPoison and TrustFall. Approve once → command swapped silently. Project-local MCP servers execute without a separate user prompt.
Pattern 2 — Indirect prompt injection → file write → RCE
CurXecute. IPI in Slack/repo → agent writes .cursor/mcp.json → Cursor executes malicious MCP command under dev privileges.
Pattern 3 — Sandbox escape via privileged side-channel
CVE-2026-26268 (CVSS 9.9). Sandboxed agent writes .git/config → next git op executes hook out-of-sandbox. .git/ was not enumerated in the sandbox boundary. NomShub follows the same pattern via shell RC files.
Pattern 4 — Supply chain
CVE-2025-64106 (installer spoofing), OpenVSX namespace squatting, unpinned npx @latest.
All four patterns are closed by gates in this package. A single MDM push (Cursor 2.5+) closes Patterns 2 and 3 at the platform level — but Patterns 1 and 4 are architectural and require enforcement regardless of version.
examples/cursor-sovereign-runtime/
│
├── enforcement/
│ ├── ai_safe2_engine.py NEXUS kernel — stdlib only
│ ├── sovereign_cursor.py 8-surface Cursor enforcement class
│ └── __init__.py
│
├── .cursor/
│ └── rules/
│ └── ai-safe2-sovereign.mdc → Drop into .cursor/rules/ workspace
│
├── controls/
│ └── policy.yaml Machine-readable registry with CVE kill chains
│
├── integrations/
│ ├── nomshub-defense.md CVE-2026-26268 + NomShub kill chain analysis
│
├── cursor-skill/
│ └── ai-safe2-cursor.md Claude/Cursor skill for Cursor sessions
│
├── ci-cd/
│ └── github-actions-cursor-gate.yml
│
├── reports/ Audit logs (gitignore)
├── smoke_test.py 21/21 adversarial tests (maps to real CVEs)
├── requirements.txt
├── QUICKSTART.md
└── README.md
cd examples/cursor-sovereign-runtime
PYTHONPATH=enforcement python3 smoke_test.py
# TOTAL: 21/21 -- SOVEREIGN BASELINE VERIFIED
Highest-impact single action: Pin Cursor to 2.5+ via MDM. Closes CVE-2026-26268 (CVSS 9.9), CurXecute, MCPoison, and .cursorignore bypass in one push.
from enforcement.sovereign_cursor import CursorSovereignRuntime
guard = CursorSovereignRuntime(
allowed_mcp_servers=["github-mcp"],
shell_command_allowlist=["git status", "npm test"],
)
guard.scan_rules_file(content, filename) # CU-RULES
guard.scan_mcp_json(content, ".cursor/mcp.json") # CU-MCP (CurXecute)
guard.scan_mcp_server_registration(name, cmd) # CU-TRUST (MCPoison)
guard.scan_repo_file(content, filepath) # CU-REPO (CVE-2026-26268)
guard.scan_shell_command(cmd, context) # CU-CMD (CVE-2026-22708)
guard.scan_cursorignore(content) # CU-IGNORE (CVE-2025-64110)
guard.scan_cloud_agent_task(task, repo_url) # CU-CLOUD
guard.scan_mcp_install(package, install_cmd) # CU-SUPPLY (CVE-2025-64106)
| Pillar | Controls | Cursor Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| P1 Sanitize-Isolate | P1.T1.2, P1.T1.9, P1.T1.10, P1.T1.4_ADV, P1.T2.1, P1.T2.5, P1.T2.6, S1.3, S1.5, S1.6 | All 8 CU surfaces |
| P2 Audit-Inventory | P2.T3.1, A2.5 | SHA-256 JSONL + MCPoison state tracking |
| P3 Fail-Safe | F3.2 | Shell command governor |
| P4 Engage-Monitor | P4.T7.1, M4.5 | HITL gate on MCP; tool-misuse detection |
| P5 Evolve-Educate | E5.1 | Love Equation + GREEN/YELLOW/RED |
| CP Cross-Pillar | CP.9, CP.10 | Cloud agent sub-agent governance; HEAR for port/tool auth |
"cursor.mcp.disableProjectLocalServers": truescan_cloud_agent_task() validates the prompt, not the cloud VM’s execution. Cloud VM-level enforcement requires Cursor’s enterprise runtime controls.See the centralized Cursor legacy integration guide.
examples/
├── cursor-sovereign-runtime/ ← THIS PACKAGE (series complete)
├── manus-sovereign-runtime/
├── lovable-sovereign-runtime/
├── xai-grok-sovereign-runtime/
└── make-sovereign-runtime/
MIT License — Cyber Strategy Institute “Engineered Certainty for the Agentic Age.”
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AI SAFE² v3.1 | Cyber Strategy Institute