| ← Profile | Controls | Challenge Lab |
The agent-to-payment plane: everything between a principal’s objective and irreversible settlement, for autonomous systems that move value without a human present at each transaction.
In scope: compromised agent runtimes, hostile merchants and facilitators, malicious child agents, poisoned negotiation content, registry compromise, delegation escalation, protocol downgrade, economic drain, revocation races, settlement ambiguity, evidence inadequacy, consent decay.
Out of scope: the security of the underlying rails themselves (card network fraud systems, blockchain consensus, bank authorization), the model provider’s infrastructure, and the principal’s own decision to spend.
The critical failure is not a single boundary. It is a chain of state transitions, each of which can be attacked independently:
human objective
→ agent interpretation ← prompt injection lands here
→ merchant negotiation ← untrusted content enters here
→ mandate rendering ← what the human actually sees
→ human approval ← signature covers THIS, not the objective
→ agent delegation ← authority can widen here
→ credential release ← key residency decides everything here
→ payment verification ← path assurance can be downgraded here
→ settlement ← finality is decided here
→ fulfillment ← divergence surfaces here, too late
Two structural observations drive every control in the profile:
Cryptography proves an object did not change. It cannot prove the object was a faithful translation of a prior intention. The signature at “human approval” is valid, verifiable and covers exactly the wrong thing if the rendering was shaped by a compromised agent.
Runtime attestation proves specified code loaded. It cannot alone establish that a nondeterministic model’s current action is semantically authorized. Measurement closes the host-compromise case and leaves the semantic case open, which is why deterministic constraint evaluation sits beside it rather than behind it.
| Adversary | Capability | Primary objective | Why current protocols do not stop them |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compromised agent host | Full control of the agent process, its identity credentials and its mandates | Mint valid authorizations | Every signature they produce is genuine. Identity and mandate protocols verify it correctly because it is correct |
| Prompt-injection operator | Controls content the agent reads - catalogs, reviews, other agents’ replies | Shape the mandate before it is signed | AP2’s own security model concedes prompt injection cannot be assumed preventable; the mandate is signed after the influence has landed |
| Hostile merchant | Authentic, registered, baseline-matching | Sell the wrong thing at a permitted price; substitute destination after approval | Provenance checks confirm identity, not honesty |
| Malicious facilitator | Sits in the settlement path | Substitute destination, delay to force retry, manufacture ambiguity | Facilitator identity is usually a routing detail, not a trust decision |
| Malicious child agent | Holds a legitimately delegated grant | Widen its own authority; distribute spend below every threshold | Per-transaction limits are evaluated per transaction |
| Insider | Can edit policy or reach signing infrastructure | Change constraints or route around the policy engine | Separation of duties is rarely enforced across negotiate/approve/sign/settle |
| Nation-state / organized theft | Supply chain, developer social engineering, key theft, long dwell | Drain agent treasuries at scale | Agent wallets on irreversible rails are a softer target than exchanges, with no chargeback to unwind |
DPRK-linked operations have repeatedly demonstrated that custody infrastructure, third-party software, developers and signing workflows are viable paths to large-scale cryptocurrency theft. Reported 2025 losses attributed to North Korean actors exceeded $2 billion. Those techniques map onto agent-payment systems directly:
| Established technique | Agent-payment equivalent |
|---|---|
| Software and dependency compromise | Malicious payment adapter or signer library |
| Developer social engineering | Poisoned deployment or credential broker |
| Private-key theft | Mandate, wallet, agent or facilitator impersonation |
| Supply-chain compromise | Malicious model, skill, MCP server or agent package |
| Session or token theft | Mandate replay, payment-channel takeover |
| Address substitution | Merchant or settlement-destination replacement |
| Insider placement | Trusted operator manipulating policy or signing infrastructure |
| Cross-chain laundering | Rapid movement after irreversible agent settlement |
Nation-state risk belongs in the threat model. It does not belong in the initial product thesis: the controls that stop it are the same controls that stop a misconfigured child agent, and the second case is far more common and far easier to sell against.
Likelihood and impact are assessed for an enterprise running ACT-3 agents with real spending authority. “Residual” is what remains after the named controls, assuming they are correctly deployed.
| # | Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Controls | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Poisoned mandate rendering. Compromised agent shapes what the human approves while preserving valid signatures | High | Critical | APAY-02, APAY-03, APAY-04 | Medium. Rendering is derived from constraints and ambiguity cannot be model-resolved, but a principal who approves a correctly rendered bad bargain is not protected by any of this |
| R2 | Runtime substitution. Valid identity and mandate replayed from an unauthorized workload | Medium | Critical | APAY-05, APAY-06, I-7 | Low where hardware attestation is available; High where it is not, and the profile says so rather than accepting a declared measurement |
| R3 | Checkout TOCTOU. Merchant, item, price, shipping, recurrence or destination changes after approval | High | High | APAY-12, APAY-11, APAY-15 | Low. Canonical-field binding is mechanical |
| R4 | Revocation race. Cached grants, facilitators, child agents or open channels permit spend after the kill decision | High | Critical | APAY-13, I-8, epoch re-read at credential release | Medium. In-path components are covered; a facilitator holding an authorization it has not yet submitted is not, and no protocol currently lets us reach it |
| R5 | Salami drain. Spend distributed across children, merchants, rails and time so every individual check passes | Medium | High | APAY-09, APAY-10, I-8 | Low for in-tree spend; Medium across rails the gateway does not sit in front of |
| R6 | Delegation escalation. Child gains authority through translation, default inheritance or protocol conversion | Medium | High | APAY-08, APAY-07, lineage re-verification at execution | Low |
| R7 | Protocol downgrade. Agent selects guest checkout, bearer auth, an alternate facilitator or a weaker rail | High | High | APAY-14, min_assurance floor | Low in-path; High if the agent has any network path that bypasses the gateway entirely. Network-level enforcement is a deployment requirement, not a profile control |
| R8 | Catalog poisoning. Signed, authentic merchant content that is semantically adversarial | High | Medium | Containment only: APAY-09, APAY-04 | High. Not solved. Provenance cannot detect this. Containment bounds the loss; it does not prevent the purchase |
| R9 | Registry compromise. Valid registry entries direct agents to hostile keys, endpoints or destinations | Low | Critical | APAY-15, destination allow-lists, baseline digests | Medium. Baseline drift is detectable; a registry compromised before baselining is not |
| R10 | Settlement ambiguity. Timeout or partial failure causes duplicate settlement or service-without-payment | High | Medium | APAY-16, APAY-18, APAY-11 | Low. Ambiguous is a first-class state and commits exposure |
| R11 | Evidence inadequacy. Logs cannot distinguish agent error, principal authorization, host compromise and merchant manipulation | High | High | APAY-19, APAY-17 | Low where PTR is complete. Note this is a liability control: there is no industry consensus on who pays when an agent transaction goes wrong, and liability tends to follow whoever cannot prove their side |
| R12 | Consent decay. Repeated approvals lead principals to accept progressively broader scope | High | High | APAY-02 rendering order, APAY-03 ambiguity surfacing | High. Partially mitigated at best. This is a human-factors failure. Making breadth legible is not the same as preventing habituation |
| R13 | Key residency failure. Payment keys reachable from the agent process | Medium | Critical | APAY-06, NullCredentialBroker default | Low if a real signer is bound; Critical if someone replaces the refusing default with a permissive stub. This is the single most damaging change available in the codebase |
| R14 | Cross-currency ceiling evasion. Spend routed through a currency the ceiling does not cover | Medium | High | Money refuses cross-currency comparison; unmatched currency denies | Medium. Requires operators to declare converted ceilings per currency; the profile makes the gap explicit rather than silently converting at an attacker-influenced rate |
Fail-closed is the default path, not the error path. Missing runtime measurement, unreachable revocation authority, expired quote, unverified merchant - none produce “allow with a warning”. A control that degrades to permissive under load is load-bearing only when nothing is wrong.
Unknown is not the same as revoked. An unreachable revocation authority produces reconcile, not deny. Value does not move, but a human resolves the state rather than the caller retrying into a duplicate settlement.
Ambiguous settlement commits exposure. A timeout counted as zero spend is how a rail failure becomes free money. Exposure is reversed by reconciliation, not assumed away.
No language model participates in a payment decision. A policy engine an attacker can talk to is a policy engine an attacker can talk out of.
Money is integer minor units. Floating point in a spend ceiling is not a rounding quirk. Accumulated error is exactly the signal a micro-drain attack hides inside.
The broker repeats checks the firewall already made. Not redundancy: the assumption that the caller might be the compromised component.
Attenuation is re-derived at execution, not trusted from mint time. Checking only at delegation trusts that nothing edited a grant afterwards.
Restated together, because a threat model that only lists wins is marketing.
CP.5.APAY/0.4 draft · NEXUS v0.6.0 · AI SAFE² v3.1