Every operator-facing feature has a human name and a stable technical name. The human name explains the protection; the technical name is the API or type.
| Step | Human name | Technical name | What is implemented | Honest boundary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Spend Hold | ExposureReservation |
Atomic reservation before credential release; settled and ambiguous outcomes commit exposure; definitive failure releases it | Reference in-memory state, not a distributed transaction coordinator |
| 2 | Runtime Proof | AttestationVerifier |
Fail-closed verifier contract, challenge/signer/evidence fields, and a test-only HMAC verifier | Production TDX/SNP/TPM/cloud-verifier bindings remain required |
| 3 | Full-Term Approval Seal | TransactionIntent.canonical_fields |
Approval now binds geography, finality, facilitator, assurance, capability, quote expiry, and merchant-verification state | A digest proves fidelity to the rendered terms, not that the bargain was wise |
| 4 | Human Shield | UserControlPolicy |
Principal pause, merchant block, approved-payee control, amount confirmation, and cooling-off policy | Applications must provide an authenticated, independent confirmation surface |
| 5 | SafePay Exact | X402V2ExactEVMUSDCBinding |
Narrow x402 v2 exact/EVM/authorization-flow validator with allowlists, continuity claims, strict requirement equality, and read-only reconciliation | Shadow mode only; it does not verify chain signatures or call a live facilitator |
| 6 | Attack Gauntlet | test_apay_hardening.py |
Tests for reserved-exposure overspend, amount-less ambiguity, approval mutation, user pause, x402 substitution, and keyed evidence commitments | Full pytest execution requires the development dependency set |
| 7 | Evidence Vault | DurableEvidenceLedger |
Fsynced JSONL evidence, hash chaining, HMAC record integrity, and keyed disclosure commitments | Confidentiality requires an encrypted volume or KMS envelope; no home-grown encryption is claimed |
None of these controls authorize production use by themselves. A deployment must:
attested=true.RailGuard Contract (RailBindingContract) declares the exact protocol
version, scheme, networks, assets, payment flow, finality model, native assurance
ceiling, and whether verification is authoritative. RailGuard Lab
(RailBindingConformanceSuite) evaluates public synthetic vectors for canonical
binding, fail-closed authority checks, assurance overclaiming, finality,
reconciliation safety, deterministic input handling, and payload privacy.
Every implemented rail binding must pass RailGuard Lab before it can be described as supported. Reports intentionally omit payloads and retain only case names and control findings so conformance evidence does not become payment-data leakage.
SafePay Verified (X402V2ExactEVMUSDCAuthoritativeBinding) adds an
authoritative-verifier boundary for x402 v2 exact EVM payments. Authenticated
verification and settlement evidence must bind the exact facilitator request
digest. Facilitator identity is allowlisted; successful settlement must match the
approved network and amount and include a transaction identifier. Verifier
outages halt instead of falling back to structural assurance.
The interface follows the x402 Foundation v2 specification’s read-only
POST /verify and state-committing POST /settle split:
https://github.com/x402-foundation/x402/blob/main/specs/x402-specification-v2.md.
The included fixture verifier is test evidence only. Production deployments must
inject a mutually authenticated facilitator client or independently operated
chain verifier and protect its trust roots outside the agent process.
SafePay Variable (X402V2UptoBinding) preserves the distinction between the
client-signed ceiling and the server-metered actual charge, accepting zero or
partial settlement only when actual <= ceiling. SafePay Escrow
(X402V2EscrowBinding) models the separate deposit and claim/refund settles,
requires deposit before resource execution, and requires an authenticated
voucher even for a zero-charge refund. Its reference phase store is in-memory;
production deployments must use durable, transactional channel state so restart
or concurrency cannot replay a deposit or claim.
Mandate Bridge (AP2V02Binding) is a narrow AP2 v0.2 profile for one
configured direct or autonomous flow. It enforces exact mandate type versions,
checkout-to-payment hash continuity, audience and currency allowlists, expiry,
NEXUS authority continuity, autonomous open-mandate key confirmation, and
explicit selective disclosures before invoking a trusted deterministic verifier.
That verifier—not the agent—must authenticate SD-JWT/JWS signatures, the
merchant checkout JWT, constraint evaluation, key confirmation, and replay or
single-use state. Signed receipt verification is a separate evidence step.
Mandate Bridge deliberately does not parse or trust cryptographic claims inside the agent process. Production deployments must inject an independently operated verifier with protected trust roots and durable replay, budget, recurrence, and receipt state. AP2 mandate assurance remains below Runtime Proof.
Card Trust Bridge (VisaTAPBinding) recognizes only Visa TAP payment
requests whose RFC 9421 signature covers method, authority, path, and content
digest and whose signed payment container is linked by nonce, key, and algorithm.
Its contract is pinned to the dated merchant-spec@2026-09-22 snapshot because
Visa’s public Merchant Specification exposes no formal version identifier; the
related Web Bot Auth dependency is an active Internet-Draft, not an RFC.
A trusted deterministic verifier must prove signature validity, exact covered components, freshness, replay/relay prevention, allowlisted-key trust, bounded SSRF-safe discovery, and payment-container binding. Recognition establishes at most Signed Request assurance. It does not prove user mandate, uncompromised runtime, payment authorization, or settlement.
Production callers should use bind_transaction as the single verification and
canonical-binding operation. Every invocation reaches the durable replay
verifier; no accepted nonce is cached. The non-consuming assurance_of query
therefore reports NONE; verified assurance is returned only in the operation’s
BindingResult.
Agent Token Bridge (MastercardAP4MBinding) is pinned to Mastercard’s
public-product@2026-09-23 description of Agent Pay for Machines. Mastercard
does not expose a public AP4M wire or token schema, so the binding treats
credential and authorization artifacts as opaque references and never claims
proprietary-token compatibility.
An authenticated network verifier must establish credential status, agent and principal binding, verifiable authorization, exact transaction binding, scope, per-transaction and cumulative spend, velocity, counterparty, currency, freshness, revocation, and replay safety. Settlement evidence is verified separately against the exact rail, currency, amount, transaction identifier, configured finality, authority continuity, and settlement guarantee. Network assurance cannot prove Runtime Proof, user wisdom, or absence of fraud. Authority preflight is non-consuming; canonical binding requires the verifier to atomically consume replay state, so a legitimate two-step evaluation works once and every later binding attempt fails closed.
Portable Delegation Bridge (KYAOSBinding) is pinned to KYA-OS Protocol
v1.0.0, Entity Card v1.1, and the org.kya-os/proof.v1 request-proof profile.
It requires a conformant verifier to establish DID holder-key control, audience
and request binding, delegation-chain continuity and attenuation, trust root,
scope and constraints, user consent, freshness, revocation, and accept-once
replay protection. Every required payment constraint axis must map losslessly;
an unknown or unmapped axis rejects the request.
This is an authority overlay, not a settlement protocol. It cannot prove that funds moved, reconcile an ambiguous payment, attest workload integrity, validate merchant honesty, or replace a user’s consequential-action approval. The configured finality is an externally established property of the signed payment operation, not a claim derived from KYA-OS.
Verifier Contract Shield (CrossAdapterSecuritySuite) applies the same
fail-closed verifier rules across every authoritative profile: evidence must be
the declared runtime type; security flags pass only when they are exactly
True; a verifier’s free-text reason cannot overwrite another failed check;
metadata queries cannot consume replay state; and no adapter may claim native
Runtime Proof.
The shared suite checks evidence defaults and assurance ceilings; behavioral
attack cases remain beside each adapter so they exercise its real boundary.
| Human name | Technical name | Native ceiling | Settlement authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| SafePay Verified | X402V2ExactEVMUSDCAuthoritativeBinding |
Mandate Bound | Facilitator/chain verifier |
| Mandate Bridge | AP2V02Binding |
Mandate Bound | Signed receipt chain only |
| Card Trust Bridge | VisaTAPBinding |
Signed Request | None |
| Agent Token Bridge | MastercardAP4MBinding |
Mandate Bound | Authenticated network evidence |
| Portable Delegation Bridge | KYAOSBinding |
Mandate Bound | None |
These profiles interoperate through NEXUS canonical transaction and authority digests, not by translating private credentials into a lowest-common-denominator token. Runtime Proof, Spend Hold, Human Shield, cumulative exposure, and revocation-tree enforcement remain NEXUS controls above every adapter.
Extend by profile, never by making SafePay Exact generic. Each new adapter gets its own human name, technical type, conformance corpus, and explicit tuple:
protocol version × scheme × network × asset × payment flow × finality model.
Recommended sequence:
X402V2ExactEVMUSDCBaseBinding): add chain-aware
signature/authorization verification and a Coinbase-independent facilitator.X402V2EscrowBinding): model both settlement calls,
deposit ceilings, refunds, deadlines, and mediated recourse separately.X402V2UptoBinding): distinguish authorized maximum,
actual charge, unused reservation release, and server-led settlement state.AP2V02Binding): map Checkout and Payment Mandates onto
the Full-Term Approval Seal and require deterministic constraint evaluation.VisaTAPBinding) and Agent Token Bridge
(MastercardAgenticTokenBinding): add recognition without upgrading it to
Runtime Proof.KYAOSBinding): translate only dimensions
with lossless attenuation; reject every unmapped scope axis.Every extension must preserve four invariants: no value without a Spend Hold; no credential without Runtime Proof at the configured floor; no settlement outside the Full-Term Approval Seal; and no ambiguity that restores spend.